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    The British government has been debating how to escape from the lockdown 
without provoking a resurgence of the Covid-19 disease. There is a growing 
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recognition of the damage the lockdown has caused to economic and social life, 
This paper presents a simple cost-benefit analysis inspired by optimal control 
theory and incorporating the SIR model of disease propagation. It also reports 
simulations informed by the theoretical discussion. The optimal path for 
government intervention is computed under a variety of conditions. These 
include a cap on the permitted level of infection to avoid overloading the health 
system, and the introduction of a test and trace system. We quantify the benefits 
of early intervention to control the disease. We also examine how the 
government’s valuation of life influences the optimal path.  A ten-week 
lockdown is only optimal if the value of life for Covid-19 victims exceeds £10 
million. The study is based on a standard but simple epidemiological model, and 
should therefore be regarded as presenting a methodological framework rather 







A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Covid-19 Disease 
There has been a debate in Britain about the best policy for dealing with the 
Covid-19 virus.  The official policy was originally to proceed step by step and 
intensify, as required, the measures that encourage hygiene and social 
distancing. Such measures range from careful hand-washing through to the 
banning of large public gatherings, the closing of pubs, restaurants and many 
shops, quarantine or near quarantine of vulnerable people, and restrictions on  
national and international travel. The gradualist approach of the government 
was attacked by critics who called for vigorous action of the type observed in 
Italy and Spain. The government responded by implementing an unprecedented 
lockdown on economic and social life. A factor behind this change of heart was 
concern about the potential shortage of intensive care beds if the disease was 
not brought quickly under control. At the time of writing, the government was 
still searching for a way to exit the lockdown without provoking a surge in the 
disease. 
The measures required to inhibit disease transmission can be very costly in 
economic and social terms, including “diseases of despair” among the millions 
who lose their jobs. These costs must be weighed against the medical benefits of 
intervention. The decision when to intervene and on what scale is a classic 
optimum control problem.  This paper explores the choices facing the 
government using a simple mathematical model inspired by optimal control 
4 
 
theory4. For clarity we omit details of the full optimal control model which are 
to be found in Rowthorn (2020).  The paper complements the theoretical 
analysis with some illustrative simulations. These simulations should not be 
taken literally but they indicate some of the issues and orders of magnitude 
involved. 
The economic literature on the optimal control of disease is sparse and its 
models mostly deal with individual behaviour and the externalities of individual 
decision-making with regard to treatment, vaccination or social distancing.5  
These are not our concern here. Our interest is in the cost-benefit analysis of 
large-scale interventions such as lockdowns. This involves an approach that is 
unusual in the existing optimal control literature on disease. Costs and benefits 
in existing optimal control models are typically functions of the health of 
individuals, computed by assigning values or weights to individuals according 
to their health status.  This is a procedure followed here. However, unlike these 
 
4 The term "optimal control theory" is conventionally restricted to models that 
utilise Pontryagin's maximum principle.  
5 Toxvaerd (2020) for a brief survey of this literature. Among the articles worthy 
of note are Chen (2012), Chen et al. (2011), Fenichel (2013), Gersovitz (2010), 
Reluga (2010), Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2015), Sethi (1978), Toxvaerd (2019), 




models we also make an explicit allowance for the more general costs of 
comprehensive interventions such as lockdowns. Such costs depend on the scale 
and type of intervention but they are not linked in a direct way to the health 
status of individuals. These costs are given a central role in this paper. 
Since the outbreak of the epidemic there has been a spate of thought-provoking 
articles on economic aspects of Covid-19. Two, in particular, deserve special 
mention. Acemoglu et al (2020) examine targeted lockdowns in a multi-group 
SIR model where infection, hospitalization and fatality rates vary between 
groups - in particular between the "young", "the middle-aged" and the "old". 
They also allow for the fact that lockdown damages the economy and reduces 
the productivity of non-infected members of the workforce.  Their paper, 
incidentally, contains a good review of the recent literature. Giordano et al 
(2020) draw on the experience of the Italian epidemic. Their model 
distinguishes between detected and undetected infection cases, and between 
cases with different severity of illness. They argue that social-distancing 
measures are necessary and effective, and should be promptly enforced at the 
earliest stage. They also argue that lockdown measures can only be relieved 
safely when an effective system of testing and contact tracing is in place. These 




A system of testing and tracing is most effective when the number of people to 
be tested or contacted is relatively small.  It may be feasible to test small 
subgroups of the population on a frequent basis and trace their contacts if they 
test positive (Cleevely et al, 2020).  Care home workers are an example. 
However, a policy of targeted testing is of limited use as a means of infection 
control if the disease is widespread, since most of the infected population will 
not be in the groups selected for testing. The alternative is universal and 
frequent random testing, but this likely to be prohibitively expensive, as 
Cleevely et al point out. If the scale of infection is too large for the system of 
testing and tracing to handle unaided and if there is currently no treatment or 
vaccine, some form of social distancing will be required.  This is the case in the 
present article. Indeed, our basic model goes further.  It assumes that a perfect 
vaccine will become available on a known date in the future and that prior to 
this date there exists no testing and tracing regime at all. There is also no 
currently available treatment for the disease. Hence social distancing is the only 
feasible means of disease control.  However, in one simulation we consider a 
scenario in which a test and trace regime is established in advance of 
vaccination. 
The analysis assumes that the scale of social distancing is determined by 
government fiat alone.  In reality, as the disease spreads and people become 
aware of the risks involved, there will be a degree of voluntary social 
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distancing. As a result, the more apocalyptic predictions of what would happen 
without draconian intervention may be wide of the mark. The implications of 
endogenous behaviour are not explored here, but are the subject of another 
paper (Ormerod, Rowthorn & Nyman, 2020). 
The theoretical section of this paper was written the day after Prime Minister 
Johnson announced a full scale lockdown.  The first batch of simulations was 
completed shortly thereafter with the aim of influencing the ongoing policy 
debate. The paper including simulations was published in mid-April in the 
CEPR real time online journal Covid Economics (Rowthorn, 2020). These 
simulations were comprehensively revised in May for this issue of the Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy. By the time the journal appears, the die will have 
been cast and the actual policy choices of the government will be there for all to 
see. However, we hope that this paper will continue to provide a useful 
framework for thinking about the cost-benefit analysis of disease control. Our 
study is based on a standard but simple epidemiological model, and should 
therefore be regarded as presenting a methodological framework rather than 
giving policy prescriptions. 
The Model 
The analysis in this paper uses a modified version of the standard SIR model of 
disease propagation. Ignoring births and deaths from non-Covid-19 causes, the 
initial population will divide in the future into three groups of people: 
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susceptible, infected, and removed, denoted, respectively, by S(t), I(t) and R(t).  
The removed group includes people who have died from the disease. They are 
denoted by D(t).  The population at the start of the epidemic is normalized to 1, 
so these various quantities can be interpreted as shares. Individuals who are 
infected remain infectious until they recover or die. Infected individuals who 
recover acquire complete immunity, so the journey from S(t) via I(t) to R(t) is in 
one direction only. 
The dynamics of the disease are determined by the following equations: 
                                 (1)  
                      (2) 
                                                                                                         (3) 
                                                                     (4) 
                                                                                                         (5) 
                                                                                                          (6) 
                                                                    (7) 
                                                                   (8) 
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                                                        (9) 
where  and   are constant. These constants indicate, respectively, the rate at 
which infected individuals cease to be infectious, and the probability than an 
infected individual will die. Note that there are only two genuinely independent 
state variables in this model.  For example, if the trajectories of I(t) and R(t) are 
known, the trajectories of S(t) and D(t) are uniquely determined by equations 
(1) and (4)..   
Equation (1) indicates how the pool of susceptible individuals is depleted by the 
outflow of newly infected individuals. Assuming that social encounters are 
random, the probability that a susceptible individual will be infected in a given 
unit of time is proportional to the prevalence of infection in the population. 
Equation (2) indicates how the pool of currently infected individuals is 
augmented by the inflow of newly infected individuals and depleted by the 
outflow of infected individuals who recover or die. The rate of outflow is  
of whom a fraction  are dead. Equation (3) indicates how the removed 
category is augmented by the inflow of newly recovered or dead individuals. 
The coefficient   in equation (1) is a variable which depends on the current 
intensity of social interaction. The intensity of social interaction depends, in 
turn, on the measures that the government puts in place to inhibit the spread of 
the disease.  Specifically, it is assumed that: 







                       (10) 
where  is an index of policy severity. The effective reproduction rate of the 
disease is 
                (11) 
where      
                                                      
The number    indicates how many people the average infected person would 
infect in a situation where everyone was susceptible to the disease and there was 
no government intervention to control its spread. The number   indicates 
how many people are infected if there is government intervention and some 
people are immune. If , the prevalence of the disease will diminish 
through time. 
Government intervention comes at a cost  in the form of damage to the 
economy. This cost is independent of the number of people currently infected 
and is the result of society-wide measures to control the disease. It is in addition 
to the various costs arising directly from infection. The function  is 
assumed to be twice differentiable and such that 
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where  is an upper limit beyond which it is not feasible to increase . 
Thus,  is strictly convex over the relevant range.  Examples are shown in 
Figure 1 which plots the function   for various values of  
.  When   is close to zero, the marginal cost of intervention is low but rises 
steeply at higher values of  . These are realistic assumptions. Think of hand-
washing at one end of the scale and the closure of shops, pubs, cafes and 
restaurants at the other. 
The government is assumed to have perfect foresight.  Thus, the entire control 
trajectory is decided at the very outset.  The system is therefore open loop, 
whereas in a closed loop system, the control is modified in the light of new 
information.  We assume that an effective vaccine will become available at time 
T at negligible cost.6  For simplicity we also assume that a cure will become 
available at the same time as the vaccine at zero cost.  
 
6 In a game theoretic paper on social distancing Reluga (2010) also assumes that 
vaccination will occur on a fixed date in the future.  In their recent paper 
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The government chooses the trajectory q(t) so as to minimise the following 
quantity subject to the foregoing equations: 
                                               
(13) 
where  is the monetary value that planners assign to each person who is 
currently alive and infected and  the additional value they assign to those who 
die. 
Define total economic cost as follows: 
             (14) 
Thus, 
                                       (15) 
Total economic cost refers to the cost of economy-wide measures such as 
lockdown, plus the various costs arising directly from the disease, such as the 
cost of treatment and the loss of output due to withdrawal from production of 
infected individuals and their close associates..  The monetary allowance for 
death   is not included in economic cost since it is assumed that most of the 
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not have a significant effect on output. Their cost of treatment prior to death is 
covered by the  term which is an average for all infected individuals, 
including those who die and those who are asymptomatic or require no 
treatment. 
Simulation 
    The  optimization problem defined above has no explicit solution. In the 
absence of such a solution, the obvious procedure is to explore the properties of 
the system by means of numerical simulation. We solved the optimisation 
problem by posing it as a nonlinear programming problem.7  
 Assumptions 
  The simulations assume that the cost of intervention is given by the function: 
                              (16) 
 where  is the cost of  the maximum feasible lockdown and . The 
larger is the value of    the lower is the cost of the other interventions relative 
to lockdown and the greater is the economic benefit of moving to less draconian 
forms of intervention (Figure 1). 
 
7 This involved discretising time into steps of tenths of a week, then minimising 
a function of 520 variables (in one case 1040 variables) under constraints. We 















    Our simulations use parameter values that we hope are realistic, although 
given the paucity of reliable data, a fair amount of guesswork is involved. The 
simulations take 1 April 2020 as their notional starting point for optimization, 
although the epidemic is assumed to have started some weeks earlier.. The 
lockdown was officially announced on 23 March but it was not until 1 April that 
it had clear effect on the number of people infected (King's College, 2020). The 
unit of time is a week and the time horizon is T=52. The monetary unit of 
account is thousands of UK pounds. There are initially 2 million people 
currently infected and therefore infectious. In addition a further 1.4 million have 
had the disease and recovered or died. The UK population is assumed to be 66.8 
million. The initial conditions are thus I₀=0.030, R₀=0.021. The death rate is 
 percent.  
    The parameters in the baseline scenario have the following values: ,  
, , ,   Infected individuals cease to be infectious 
at an exponential rate of -1.6 per week, which implies that after two weeks 96 
percent are no longer infectious. They have either recovered or died.  In the 
absence of intervention the net reproduction rate . The per capita weekly 
cost of full lockdown is £200 which is approximately 35 percent of per capita 
GDP at factor cost, in line with the OBR prediction of what the lockdown might 
do to the UK to the economy (OBR, 2020). The values  and  
assume that planners assign a monetary value of £2,000 per week to the average 
0.7d =
0 4.8b =
1.6g = max 0.20C = 2Ap = 2,000Dp =
0 3r =
2Ap = 2,000Dp =
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currently infected person, plus a further £2 million to each fatality. The latter 
figure is what the UK Treasury assumes in project evaluation as the value of a 
prevented fatality (Dolan and Jenkins, 2020).  To derive the path before 1 April, 
we assume that 4.7 weeks previously the state of the system was 
  From this starting point the system is 
assumed to grow freely with parameters  until 1 April, when 
government intervention in our simulations begins.  We ignore the limited 
interventions of the government before 1 April.  
  
8 8
4.7 4.7 4.7 4.71 10 , 10 , 0, 0.S I R D
- -
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Tables 1 and 2 provide information about the optimum path under various 
scenarios. The numbers for deaths and total economic cost in these tables have 
been adjusted to include the pre-intervention weeks. This is a small adjustment 
which does not materially affect the results. It makes it easier to compare 
scenarios with different starting dates for intervention.  
    Figure 2 shows what happens if the government does nothing to control the 
disease and restricts itself to the medical treatment of those infected. Within a 
few weeks 90 percent of the population have been infected and the cumulative 
death toll by the end of the year is 440 thousand (Table 1). At the peak of the 
epidemic twenty million people are currently infected and hence infectious. 
    Under the Baseline scenario, the optimum response of the government is to 
impose a tight lockdown at the very beginning of the planning year. The 
lockdown lasts 5.3 weeks and brings the disease under control quite soon, 
although not before millions of people have been infected and many thousands 
have died (Figure 3). The eventual death toll is 60,000. The death toll is so high 
because the lockdown is not complete.  Lockdown reduces the transmission of 
the disease but does not entirely prevent it. As a result there is inertia in the 
system. If the level of infection is already high when the lockdown is imposed, 
this will continue to be the case for some time thereafter. This is a good reason 
for acting swiftly before the disease has really taken hold. Once the lockdown is 
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relaxed there is a prolonged period when it is optimal to maintain restrictions 
close to the minimal level required to contain the disease (Figure 4).  During 
this period the effective reproduction rate r, although rising, is close to 1 (Figure 
5). As the vaccination date draws near, restrictions are lifted at an accelerating 
pace until eventually they are largely abandoned. The result is a brief 
resurgence of infection which is halted by vaccination or treatment. 
    Figure 6 compares the course of infection under various scenarios. Under the 
Early Start scenario, the lockdown is imposed a week earlier with the result that 
infection and deaths are much lower.  The eventual death toll is around 8,000 as 
compared to 60,000 under the Baseline scenario. The lockdown is also much 
shorter: 0.9 weeks as compared to 5.3 weeks. This comparison illustrates clearly 
the harm that may arise from even a short delay. 
    In Rowthorn (2020), it was argued that extending the planning horizon does 
not greatly affect the results.  This conclusion is not supported by the more 
sophisticated simulations reported here.  Suppose the vaccine comes on stream 
after two years instead of one.  The effect on the optimal path is dramatic. There 
is no lockdown and the final death toll is 271,000. Peak infection is 7 million 
and eventually over 40 percent of the population catch the disease. Infection on 
the peak scale would impose an intolerable burden on the health system. To 
avoid such an eventuality, we repeat the simulation with a ceiling of 3.3 million 
on the permitted level of infection.  This is just over fifty percent more than the 
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initial level of infection (2 million). The existence of this constraint has little 
impact on the eventual death toll, although it does reduce the peak load on the 
health system. 
    Relative costs 
    The parameter   conveys information about the relative cost of various 
interventions. When  is small the economic benefit from a partial relaxation 
of the lockdown is also small. This creates an incentive to extend the duration of 
lockdown. Why relax an effective policy for so little economic gain?  
Conversely, if  is large, the economic gain from a partial relaxation is large. 
The duration of lockdown is therefore short. Under the Baseline scenario  
and the lockdown lasts for 5.3 weeks. If , the lockdown lasts for 7.9 weeks. 
If , it lasts for 1.8 weeks. 
Test and trace 
    A test and trace system is designed to isolate infectious individuals and their 
contacts, so that they cannot infect the general population. Within the 
framework of the present model it is equivalent to either a reduction in the 
transmission coefficient  or else an increase in  the rate at which infected 
people cease to be infectious.  To explore the implications of the system 
introduced by the UK government, we assume that it becomes fully operational 










teething problems. The system has a capacity of 200,000 tests per day. We 
assume it has negligible cost. The effectiveness of a test and trace system 
depends on the following factors: (1) the number of tests carried out, (2) the 
share of infected individuals in the tested population, (3) the fraction of infected 
individuals who are available for testing, (4) the number of infected contacts 
who self-isolate following a positive diagnosis. The role of these various factors 
is discussed in the appendix.  
The parameters we use for our simulation are somewhat arbitrary, but the 
results illustrate clearly the impact of test and trace on the optimum path. Figure 
7 plots the optimum paths with and without test and trace. The effect of test and 
trace is to lower the trajectory of the control variable q. The reason for this is as 
follows. The existence of a test and trace system reduces the impact of present 
interventions on the future course of infection. Planners therefore have less need 
to be concerned about the future. They can afford to relax since test and trace 
will help deal with the outcome. This is true both before and after test and trace 
comes into operation. The test and trace system in our simulation is not perfect, 





    The value of life 
    Any cost-benefit analysis of optimal policy towards Covid-19 requires some 
assumption about the value of human life (Social Value UK, 2016; Dolan and 
Jenkins, 2020).  This assumption may be explicit or it may be implicit. 
Governments may reject the whole idea of valuing life in the context of disease 
control, but to the extent that their actions are consistent, they imply some tacit 
valuation of life. In other policy areas, such as transport and drug evaluation, it 
is normal for government agencies to put a value on life. In our simulations a 
reduction in the value of life implies to a shorter lockdown or maybe no 
lockdown at all (Table 2). This is true even if we impose a ceiling on the 
permitted scale of infection. Under the Baseline scenario, the value of life is £2 
million and the optimal lockdown lasts for 5.3 weeks. Holding other parameters 
constant, it becomes optimal to dispense with the lockdown altogether once the 
value of life drops below £1.68 million. If we impose the condition that peak 
infection must not exceed what the health service can handle, it is optimal to 
dispense with lockdown when the value of life is below £ 1.56 million.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, the optimal duration of lockdown becomes rather 
insensitive to further increases in the value of life. The optimal lockdown is not 
much different if the value of life is £10 million or £20 million (Figure 8). 
    Figure 9 plots the relationship between total deaths and total economic cost. 
Through its impact on optimal policy, the value of life affects both the 
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economic cost of the disease and the number of people who die from it.  Each 
point on the curve corresponds to a certain value of life, and the variables 
shown are calculated on the assumption that the government behaves optimally 
given this value of life.8 
The curve is downward sloping, as expected.  If the government assigns a low 
value to life it will optimally choose a trajectory that involves a very short 
lockdown or no lockdown at all.  This will ensure a low economic cost but will 
also involve a large number of deaths. Conversely, if the government assigns a 
high value to life it will opt for a long lockdown thereby saving lives, although 
at much greater economic cost.  
 A striking feature of Figure 9 is the discontinuity indicated by the broken line.  
This was unexpected, but appears genuine. We checked it using two different 
programs. This break in the curve marks the transition between two radically 
different types of policy.  To the right of the break, the optimal policy is 
lockdown with a low death rate.  To the left, the optimal policy is no lockdown 
and a high death rate. This transition occurs discontinuously when the value of 
life is around £1.68 million. It is clearly visible in Figure 8.   
What light does this discussion throw on the actual policy of the UK 
government?  The period of maximum lockdown lasted approximately ten 
weeks. With the baseline cost structure ( ), a lockdown of this length 
 
8 Technically speaking, the curve is parameterised by , 




is only optimal when the value of life exceeds £10 million.   If ,  the 
figure is £4million. These numbers are much larger than the value of life 
implied by the official guidelines for drug evaluation (£200,000 to £300,000) 9.   
To the extent that the government is behaving optimally, these comparisons 
imply that it values the lives of potential Covid-19 victims a lot more highly 
than those of certain other types of victim.  
Concluding Remarks 
         Soon after the implications of lockdown became evident people began to 
ask the obvious question:  "Is the cure worse than the disease?" (Miles, Stedman 
and Heald (2020).  Governments began to seek cost-effective policies that 
would enable them to exit the lockdown without setting off a renewed surge of 
infection. Although they are speculative in nature and limited in their 
methodology, the simulations presented here and their underlying theory may 
throw some light on government policy.  
The original motivation for the lockdown was a fear that the health system 
would be overwhelmed if the disease were to get out of hand. However, this 
 
9 The National Institute for Health Care and Clinical Excellence assumes 
£20,000-£30,000 per quality adjusted year of life. ONS life tables and statistics 
on the age, sex and underlying health condition of Covid-19 fatalities suggest 
that the average person dying from the disease lost about ten years of life. 
1f = 3Ap =
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does not explain why the lockdown continued for such a long time. The 
explanation may be inertia or excessive caution. Or it may be that the 
government (and the public) values the lives of potential Covid-19 victims far 
more highly than those of certain other types of victim. Whatever the 
explanation, it is clear that government policy towards the Covid-19 disease has 
not been subject to the same forensic cost-benefit analysis that is applied in 
other areas of health policy. . 
     In his Covid Economics paper, Rowthorn (2020) argued that, if a relatively 
inexpensive way can be found to maintain an r value close to 1, this is the 
policy to aim for in the medium term. A lockdown may (or may not) be 
necessary to halt the explosive spread of the disease, but once this aim has been 
achieved it would be a costly mistake to stick with expensive social distancing 
policies that aim to keep r well below 1. This conclusion is reinforced by our 
example of test and trace.  if there is an effective test and trace system in the 
offing, it may even be optimal to let r to exceed 1 for some weeks before this 
system becomes operational. This will cause infection to increase somewhat, 
but the potential explosion will be prevented when test and trace comes on 
stream. The same is true during the run-up to mass vaccination. 
    One issue that this paper has not dealt with is that of ignorance.  We have 
assumed that there is a menu of known policies, with known effects, from 
which the government can choose at will.  In fact governments and their 
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advisors may have very limited knowledge about the disease and potential 
policies, and they may be reluctant to experiment because they are concerned 
about the risk of a mistake. 
    Despite these caveats, we believe that the approach adopted in this paper 
provides a useful framework for thinking about policy choices and their timing. 
 
Appendix: Test and Trace 
    Throughout this appendix the symbol  refers to infected individuals who 
are not isolated and can therefore infect the susceptible population. Isolated 
individuals who are infectious are classified as removed. 
    Suppose that a fraction  of the infected population   is currently available 
for testing. The rest are either asymptomatic or unwilling to undergo testing. For 
those available for testing; the probability of not being tested positive in a 
period of length   is equal to where is constant. The probability that 
an infected individual will cease to be infectious in the small time interval is  
.   
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                                    (A1) 
The probability of being tested positive at some time is therefore 
                              (A2) 
The average length of time that an individual remains infected is .  The 
probability that he or she will test positive during a small time interval of length 
   is equal to: 
                   (A3) 
The number of infected individuals who are available for testing is .  The 
number of such individuals who test positive in the time interval  is 
therefore 
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Suppose there is no constraint on testing. Then  and the rate of testing 
infected persons is: 
                                                   (A4) 
 
In the constrained case assume that  is the maximum number of tests per 
week. Assume also that a constant fraction   of these tests is directed at 
infected persons. Then access to testing will be capacity constrained if  
. In this case 
                      (A5) 
Thus, 
                                             (A6) 
Assume that for each person who tests positive the number of infected persons 
who self-isolate (including the tested person) is . Then infected persons are 
isolated at the rate  . They are classified as removed. 
























                              (A7) 
 
 The equations of motion become:  
          (A8) 
    Our simulation assumes a daily capacity of 200,000 for test and trace.  This 
amounts to 1,400,000 per week, which is equal to a fraction 0.021 of the 
population.  Thus, . It is also assumed that test and trace system 
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cost (£ per 
capita.) 
Do nothing 2 2.0 0 20.1 439.8 14,342 
Baseline 2 2..0 5.3 2.0 59.9 6,589 
Low relative 
cost 
4 2.0 1.8 2.0 67.1 4,811 
High relative 
cost 


















2 2.0 0 3.3 268.1 2,093 
Early start  2 2.0 0.9 0.3 8.3 7,360 
























cost (£ per 
capita.) 
Baseline 2 2.0 5.3 2.0 59.9 6,589 
High value of 
life 
2 5.0 8.4 2.0 55.9 6,768 















Constrained 2 1.0 0 3.3 269.5 1,776 
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Figure 7.  Optimal paths for q: scenarios 
compared
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Figure 9. Deaths and economic cost: Baseline 
parameters (unconstrained simulation)
